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Abstract.  The idea that human cognition essentially involves 
symbolic reasoning and the manipulation of representations 
which somehow stand for entities in the real world is central to 
“cognitivist” approaches to AI and cognitive science, but has 
been repeatedly challenged within these disciplines; while the 
very idea of representation has been problematised by 
philosophers such as Dreyfus, Davidson, McDowell and Rorty.  
This extended abstract discusses Robert Brandom’s thesis that 
the representational function of language is a derivative outcome 
of social practices rather than a primary factor in mentation and 
communication, and raises some questions about the 
computational implications of his approach. 
1  Introduction 
“Where do correct ideas come from? Do they fall from the sky? 
Are they innate? No, they come from social practice”.           
Mao Zedong, “On Practice”. 
What Varela et al [13] labelled “cognitivism” (also 
known as the Computational Theory of Mind or 
CTM) is an approach to AI and cognitive science 
that postulates symbolic representations as 
fundamental to cognition: representations are taken 
to be some kind of internal constructs that somehow 
stand for entities in the real world, and function as 
“arguments” for internal deductive reasoning. On 
this view, representations involve physical states of 
the organism, so cognitive processes must be 
associated with identifiable physical changes of 
state. 
 
Some early critiques of the representational thesis 
from the standpoints of cognitive science and AI can 
be found in Varela et al [op cit] and Brooks [5]. 
Varela et al argue that the purported representations 
and operations that manipulate them are inaccessible 
to conscious (phenomenological) experience. Brooks 
reports on the development of systems which 
manifest intelligent behaviour but make no use of 
central representations; each layer or process in a  
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system has access to relevant pieces of information, 
but it is only from a third-party observer’s standpoint 
that the data can be interpreted as representing states 
of the real world. Varela et al class Brooks’ work 
along with their own as belonging to the (then) new 
enactivist paradigm. 
 
  Representationalism has also taken a battering 
within 20th century analytic philosophy (see [8,11] 
for discussion). In this extended abstract we consider 
whether the “analytic pragmatism” of Robert 
Brandom [1,2,3,4] can offer a bridge  between 
enactivist approaches and representational schemes. 
Brandom argues that while language does have  an 
essentially representational dimension, this should 
not be considered as its primary function but can be 
best captured within the context of discursive social 
practices (see [6,11]). In the course of these 
practices, language users assume responsibility and 
authority for their various claimings while attributing 
and ascribing both doxastic (propositional) and 
practical commitments and entitlements to 
themselves and others. Representations and symbolic 
reasoning are not primary or causal, but are a means 
of characterising invariants in (material) inferential 
reasoning.  Brandom sets out to show how one can 
develop accounts of linguistic meaning and 
purposeful action which are grounded in normative 
social practice, eschewing semantic or intentional 
concepts, and in particular how formal logic can be 
shown to be grounded in everyday linguistic practice 
 
  Brandom is classed by Joseph Rouse as a “practice 
theorist” ([12]; see [7] for discussion), and this 
aspect of his work seems to offer a good fit with the 
enactivist stance. Practice theory is a term that has 
been applied to a variety of approaches (or 
practices?) in the social sciences and humanities. 
What these approaches have in common is that 
theyseek to study the behaviour of individuals in 
social contexts by focussing on habitual 
performances classed as practices against a 
background of other practices, in place of such 
monolithic categories as culture, class, gender, rules, 
values, norms and so on. One motivation for this is 
that analysts can focus on observable events rather 
than postulating unobservable entities such as 
beliefs, values or traditions, or speculating about the 
psychology of the participants’ motives. In fact, in 
the course of Brandom’s works it turns out that his 
discursive practices are assumed to rely on a fair 
amount of behind-the-scenes cogitation, which we 
consider in some detail in section 3.   
 
2. Some key themes from Brandom 
 
   The essentials of the framework presented in [1] 
and [2] can be cursorily sketched as follows. 
Brandom claims to follow Kant and Frege in 
insisting on the primacy of the propositional, as the 
smallest linguistic unit for which we can take 
responsibility.  To assert a proposition is both to take 
on a commitment to defend that assertion if 
challenged, and to claim an authority to which others 
may defer when making the same assertion.  A 
commitment is understood here not as a state of 
mind but as a social status, which is constituted by 
the normative attitudes of one’s interlocutors. 
Participants in a dialogue are taken to maintain 
“deontic scoreboards” with a record of claims to 
which each participant has committed themself, 
consequential commitments which the scorekeeper 
derives by (material) inference, and commitments to 
which the scorekeeper judges the speaker to be 
entitled [1:190ff].   
 
   It is important to note that the commitments that a 
speaker will acknowledge may not match those that 
will be attributed by scorekeepers: in particular the 
scorekeepers may calculate consequential 
commitments of which the speaker is unaware. This 
is claimed to capture a difference between two 
senses of “belief”: what one is aware of or will admit 
to believing, and what follows (logically or 
otherwise) from one’s avowed beliefs.  Levesque [9] 
sought to capture this distinction with a “logic of 
implicit and explicit belief”, while Olsen [10] argues 
that Brandom’s notion of consequential 
commitments enables us to handle these phenomena, 
in particular the problem of “logical omniscience”, 
without resorting to non-standard logics.   
  “Inference” here is meant as “material” or content-
based inference as in: Edinburgh is to the East of 
Glasgow, so Glasgow is to the West of Edinburgh. 
According to Brandom these inferences are 
immediate, and do not rely on an enthymeme or 
hidden premise or meaning postulate “X is to the 
East of Y iff Y is to the West of X”.  Rather, this 
biconditional makes explicit the implicit basis of the 
inference which acculturated users of a language 
make unthinkingly.  The argument is correct by 
virtue of the meanings or appropriate uses of the 
words, not because of some covert formal deduction. 
This leads up to Brandom’s logical expressivism: 
logical reasoning supervenes on material inference, 
in that an argument is considered to be logically 
good just in case it is materially good, and cannot be 
made materially bad by any substitution of non-
logical for non-logical vocabulary in its premises or 
conclusion [2:55]. 
 
  Finally (for the purposes of this abstract) material 
inference has a role to play in analysing the semantic 
content of subsentential expressions:  
 
“Two subsentential expressions of the same 
grammatical category share a semantic 
content just in case substituting one for the 
other preserves the pragmatic potential of the 
sentences in which they occur… a pair of 
sentences may be said to have the same 
pragmatic potential if across the whole 
variety of possible contexts their utterance 
would be speech acts with the same 
pragmatic significance…” [2:128-9]. 
 
So for example, one might say that two terms have 
the same denotation (“representation”) if replacing 
one with the other makes no difference to the 
appropriate circumstances in which a speech act may 
be uttered and its pragmatic consequences, in terms 
of the speaker’s deontic score (see [8] for extended 
critical discussion of this approach). Much of the 
second half of [1] consists of elaborations of this 
substitutional technique to handle the traditional 
subject matter of formal semantics such as reference, 
anaphora, deixis, quantification and propositional 
attitudes. 
3. Processing implications of background 
practices 
 
Having briefly outlined some key elements of 
Brandom’s inferentialism, we now turn to some of 
the assumptions that seem to be made about the 
processing capabalities of communicating agents. 
 
3.1 Scorekeeping 
 
   Chapter 4, Section IV of Making it Explicit 
includes detailed instructions for deontic 
scorekeeping, including the requirement that if 
speaker B claims that p, scorekeeper A must add p to 
the list of commitments attributed to B and should 
also add “commitments to any claims q that are 
committive-inferential consequences of p…” (my 
emphases). It appears from this that agents are 
obligated to be “perfect reasoners” when 
scorekeeping even if they are not when speaking.  
This seems to threaten to revive the issue of 
“omniscience”, displaced onto the “scorekeeper” 
rather than the speaker, and has implications for the 
computational complexity of scorekeeping.  
Levesque [9] shows that for his formal system, the 
time taken to calculate what an agent believes grows 
linearly with the size of the KB (in the propositional 
case), while the time taken to calculate the 
implications of the belief grows exponentially.  Of 
course these results do not necessarily carry over to 
Brandom’s setup, but they are certainly suggestive.  
 
  Furthermore, the status of scoreboards themselves 
and the practice of deontic scorekeeping seem 
somewhat uncertain. Scorekeeping is clearly not a 
directly observable practice, but is presumably meant 
to be manifest in the practical attitudes displayed 
towards utterances: one may for example challenge 
a speaker’s entitlement to a commitment, or endorse 
it either explicitly (by repeating the claim) or 
implicitly (by remaining silent). The scoreboards 
themselves are only notional entities, with a 
troubling resemblance to representations  within a 
quasi-formal system. 
 
3.2  Substitution and expressivism 
 
  Kremer [8] questions Brandom’s reading of Kant 
and Frege and offers a detailed examination of the 
decompositional strategy of analysing the content of 
subsentential expressions, and identifying different 
subcategories such as terms and predicates according 
to the contribution they make to the inferential 
potential of propositional utterances. For example: 
the fact that one can infer “Thora is a mammal” from 
“Thora is a dog”, but not vice versa, indicates that 
mammal and dog are predicates which licence 
asymmetric substitution inferences, rather than 
terms which may license symmetric inferences 
[2:133ff]. Kremer argues that Brandom’s account is 
plagued with circularity, since it claims to define 
syntactic categories in terms of substitution 
inferences but turns out (on Kremer’s account) to 
assume a prior grasp of these very categories.  One 
could add that the substitutional techniques are 
presented in rather general terms, using simple 
examples, and would constitute a formidable 
machine learning problem if applied to corpora of 
actual discourse. For one thing, it is unlikely that any 
corpus would provide instances of “all possible 
contexts” for any given sentence-pair (see above). 
This suggests some interesting directions for future 
applied research. 
 
  As noted above, the expressivist programme seeks 
to develop a notion of formal validity based on 
exhaustive substitution of nonlogical for nonlogical 
vocabulary. There is a persuasive argument that the 
ability to endorse material or content-based 
inferences such as “Brighton is to the east of 
Worthing, so Worthing is west of Brighton” does not 
necessarily presuppose a notion of “formally valid 
inference”, as this threatens to set off a “regress of 
rules” of the kind depicted by Lewis Carroll in 
“Achilles and the Tortoise”. However the 
substitutional approach also has its problems: no 
worked examples are presented, and the claimed 
parallels with other domains such as “theological 
vocabulary” are unconvincing [2:55]. Logical words 
like “if”, so”, “then” do not necessarily behave the 
same in all possible contexts, and a “fuzzy” or 
probabilistic approach may turn out to be more 
appropriate. The assumption that agents are capable 
of evaluating universal statements involving the 
entire non-logical vocabulary of a language is surely 
an idealisation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  Brandom’s practice-oriented approach to language 
and purposeful action appears at first to offer 
theoretical support for non-cognitivist approaches to 
AI and cognitive science. This extended abstract has 
highlighted some computational and processing 
issues which argue against adopting the inferentialist 
model wholesale. The practices ascribed to 
individual language users turn out to rely on a 
complex and sophisticated analytical machinery 
which appears to require the processing resources of 
a cognitivist agent and makes idealised, perhaps 
unrealistic assumptions about agents’ processing 
capabilities. As [7] argues, Brandom [3] essentially 
offers a “competence” model of an ideal speaker-
hearer/scorekeeper rather than an “anthropological” 
account of actual practice: “Brandom’s automata 
appear to be rather unconstrained both in terms of 
their internal operations and in the range of entities 
that can be discriminated as inputs or generated as 
outputs.” Any restrictions are labelled as 
“psychological” and thus extrinsic to the explanatory 
model, though it is precisely these psychological 
restrictions which must be confronted if Brandom’s 
model is to be pressed into the service of AI and 
cognitive science. 
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